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Aid Transparency and Accountability: ‘Build it and they’ll come’?1 
Concerns about the transparency of aid have become more prominent against a 
recent backdrop of donor commitments to increase aid effectiveness. Innovative 
approaches to providing more and better information about aid have been 
developed. This article explores the contemporary focus on aid transparency  in the 
context of longer-standing concerns over accountable aid. It finds that the links 
between inputs, outputs and impacts in aid transparency and accountability 
initiatives are often not articulated or well-understood, and that the link between aid 
transparency and accountable aid is barely addressed. Future attempts to develop 
effective aid TAIs need to take full account of the diverse motivations, approaches 
and actors implicated in their – often implicit – theories of change, in particular the 
citizens of aid-recipient countries.. 
 
Key Words:  
 
1 Introduction 
Aid transparency has zoomed into focus in recent years in Northern governments, 
development academia, aid policy and advocacy circles, digital communities committed to 
open government and Northern tax-paying publics. The rapid rise to prominence of aid 
transparency concerns and initiatives, happening against a backdrop of growing interest in 
open government more broadly2, dates mainly from official aid donors’ attempts to honour 
the aid effectiveness commitments they made in Paris in 2005. By 2008 it was clear that 
these efforts were hampered by the lack of transparent and accessible data about official 
aid. As a result, aid transparency featured prominently at the Third High-Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Accra in 2008 and the Fourth High-Level Forum held in Busan in 2011. the 
multi-stakeholder International Aid Transparency Initiative was launched at Accra, and a 
host of innovative approaches were set in motion around that time by official and non-
                                               
1
 A paraphrase of Kevin Costner’s line in the 1989 American fantasy-drama film ‘Field of Dreams’, this 
phrase has become current in business innovation and marketing, to capture  to the notion – scorned 
by marketing firms - that a great product needs no marketing.   
2
 This is reflected, among other ways, in the September 2011 launch of Open Government 
Partnership, a new multilateral initiative that aims to promote more open and accountable 
government, with the ultimate goals of empowering citizens, countering corruption, promoting 
economic efficiencies, harnessing innovation, and improving the delivery of services. See 
http://www.transparency-initiative.org/news/ogp-launch-july2011 
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governmental aid actors and analysts to assess the costs of non-transparent aid, make the 
case for transparency and provide more and better information about aid (Martin, 2009)3.   
 
A quick scan reveals a dazzling range of aid transparency and accountability initiatives 
(henceforth TAIs). All have been born in the last few years and most are going from strength 
to strength.  Some fall under the fairly recently designated heading of citizen-led or social 
accountability initiatives (see Gaventa & McGee, this volume; Malena et al 2004). Others are 
strongly donor-inspired and –led and, as I shall argue, perhaps insufficiently attuned to the 
realities of citizens and social actors and over-reliant on assumptions about them.   
 
I am a development studies researcher and lecturer who watches UK development aid and 
global aid trends at some distance, and works closely on citizen-led transparency and 
accountability.  In 2010-11 I co-led a Review on the Impact and Effectiveness of 
Transparency and Accountability Initiatives, commissioned by DFID under the auspices of the 
Transparency and Accountability Initiative, focusing on social and citizen-led accountability 
and transparency activities rather than those inscribed within formal political and electoral 
accountability mechanisms.  I also conducted the segment of the review that focused on aid 
transparency, not because I am an aid transparency expert but by reason of my current 
research and applied work on social accountability and my past experience and contacts in 
the development NGO aid policy and research world. The aid transparency review 
attempted to assess the effectiveness and impact of this rapidly evolving field.   
 
In this article I do not attempt to summarise that review’s findings in respect of impact, 
which can be found elsewhere4.   Rather, I describe the aid transparency field and its origins 
(sections 2 and 3); interrogate the range of aims, claims and assumptions that arose when I 
explored effectiveness and impact questions (section 4); and, on the basis of these, set out a 
range of factors that seem important in the workings of aid transparency and accountability 
initiatives (section 5).  The argument that I advance is that insofar as can be determined 
from current knowledge on the impact of aid transparency and accountability initiatives, 
they are not adequately resolving the accountability challenges posed by the facts that (i) 
transparency has an uncertain relationship with accountability (Fox 2007); and (ii) aid 
                                               
3
 For the history of the Paris Declaration, prior and subsequent High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness 
and the Declarations emerging from each, see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_46310975_1_1_1_1,00.html 
4
 See http://www.transparency-initiative.org/workstream/impact-learning   
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accountability ‘seekers’ and ’givers’ include some very dissimilar, distant and disconnected 
groups of actors.  This means that aid TAIs will only fulfil their objectives when they pay 
greater attention to the purported beneficiaries and their actual and potential involvement 
with TAIs.  For now, most TAIs seem to work on the basis of ‘build it and they’ll come’ – the 
’they’ referring to an unspecified and nebulously conceived set of supposed aid 
accountability claimants.  Who are “they”? If “we” build the aid transparency initiative, will 
they, can they, really come and use it as “we” envisage?   
 
2 Background to the Field 
‘Aid transparency’’s contemporary forms are but the latest mutations of a longer-standing 
and broader concern with aid accountability. For explanatory purposes, aid TAIs can be 
divided into three sub-fields. In the order in which they have emerged:  
 
(i) Aid accountability thinking and practice in the development NGO sector.  Big 
international development non-governmental organisations (NGOs), particularly 
those which work through partnerships with local organisations, have been 
concerned about their own and other aid agencies’ accountability since the mid-
nineties. Their concerns focus on their accountability to public and private donors 
for funds received and spent; and their accountability to partners in the global 
South, grassroots supporters in the North, and the marginalised people they purport 
to benefit, for behaving with integrity and operating effectively. These two have 
been referred to as upwards and downwards accountability respectively.  
Accountability relationships with funders are usually ascribed formal enforceability, 
via contracts; accountability to the marginalized tends to be based on answerability 
rather than enforceability5. Two new departures stand out in NGO aid 
accountability. First, NGOs are experiencing growing tensions between their 
multiple accountabilities, recognizing these as more of a complex web than an 
upwards/downwards dyad. Second, while NGOs have been individually developing 
ways of implementing and monitoring accountability to marginalized people since 
the 1990s (a pioneer being Action Aid’s Accountability, Learning and Planning 
System (ALPS) – see David et al., 2006), increasingly they are aligning their work on 
accountability as a sector or sub-sector, collectively applying a range of self-
                                               
5
 While I use ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ here for explanatory clarity, the terms can be seen as 
reinforcing a hierarchy that, while inherent to the aid relationship, is not desirable, and some more 
recent commentators prefer the more diffuse and less directional term ‘multiple accountabilities’.  
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regulatory or peer-regulated frameworks such as the Human Accountability 
Partnership (HAP) certification, the International NGO Accountability Charter and 
One World Trust’s Global Accountability Report6.  NGO-promoted aid accountability 
initiatives are social rather than political in nature and are led by citizens and civil 
society actors, in the global North or South, in contrast to the second sub-field 
below.  
 
(ii) Official aid accountability measures of the past decade. These revolve around the 
Rome-Monterrey-Paris process and are enshrined in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. This commits official donor signatories, among other things, to 
enhancing ‘mutual7 accountability and transparency in the use of development 
resources [which] helps to strengthen public support for national politics and 
development assistance’ (OECD, 2005/8: 8). Donor signatories are answerable to 
their peers for these commitments which are monitored on a two-yearly basis. The 
official aid accountability sub-field, like the newer aid transparency movement, is 
mainly concerned with improving the effectiveness of official aid so as to reduce 
waste, heighten aid effectiveness and justify aid spending to Northern tax payers. It 
is populated mainly by donor governments and their partner governments – 
including, increasingly since Busan, non-OECD countries as donors. These official aid 
accountability initiatives lie more within the political and international relations 
arenas than the social and citizenship arena but, as with many forms of political 
accountability, the social and citizen-led accountability initiatives that grow up 
around them are often essential to their effectiveness.    
 
(iii) The new aid transparency movement, emerging since 2005. To give a flavour, some 
key players and sources in this are aidinfo, a programme within the UK-based 
organisation Development Initiatives Poverty Research, which seeks to improve 
access to high-quality, timely information on aid flows; AidData, a US University-
based collaborative initiative consisting of an online portal which connects users 
with information about aid and other development finance; the International Aid 
                                               
6
 See http://www.hapinternational.org/, http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org and 
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/ respectively. A good account of the evolution of NGO accountability 
and effectiveness activities is given by Lingán et al., 2009.  
7
 Despite the word ‘mutual’, how mutual the answerability is between aid donor signatories and their 
‘aid partners’ (recipient governments) is a contested point, not irrelevant to the aid transparency 
debate.   
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Transparency Initiative (IATI), a voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative including 
donors, partner country governments and civil society organisations (CSOs) that 
exists to help implement the Accra commitments regarding aid transparency; 
Publish What You Fund (PWYF), a global campaign for aid transparency that 
conducts advocacy, research and capacity support to this end; MyAid, a UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) fund and website which enables 
the public to vote on how a small proportion of UK aid gets spent; the UK 
government’s Aid Transparency Guarantee, which aims to make aid fully transparent 
to citizens in the UK and recipient countries, and OpenAid, a Swedish government 
initiative to make Swedish aid more transparent and open to public control.8 
 
The relatively recent genesis of many aid transparency initiatives means that not much study 
or analysis of their impact has occurred yet (Martin, 2009; Martin, 2010; Christensen et al., 
2010)9.  Often based on fairly sophisticated applications of information and communication 
technologies, they take forms quite distinct from the traditional development interventions 
on which most research, analysis and evaluation of impact and effectiveness tends to be 
carried out.  
 
My initial literature review in 2010 uncovered barely enough impact-focused literature to 
afford a purposive sample for in-depth review that represented all three of the aid TAI sub-
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 Aidinfo is a programme within the UK-based organisation Development Initiatives Poverty Research, 
which seeks to improve access to high-quality, timely information on aid flows, 
http://www.aidinfo.org. AidData is a US University-based collaborative initiative consisting of an 
online portal which connects users with information about aid and other development finance, 
http://www.aiddata.org/home/index. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is a 
voluntary, multi-stakeholder initiative including donors, partner country governments and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) that exists to help implement the Accra commitments regarding aid 
transparency, http://www.aidtransparency.net/.  Publish What You Fund (PWYF) is a global campaign 
for aid transparency that conducts advocacy, research and capacity support to this end, 
http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/issue/.  MyAid is a UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) fund and website which enables the public to vote on how a small proportion of 
UK aid gets spent, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jul/13/cameron-myaid-development. 
The UK government’s Aid Transparency Guarantee aims to make aid fully transparent to citizens in 
the UK and recipient countries (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ukaid-guarantee), and OpenAid is a Swedish 
government initiative to make Swedish aid more transparent and open to public control 
(http://www.openaid.se/en).  For further information, see, in order of mention, 
http://www.aidinfo.org/http://www.aiddata.org/home/index; http://www.aidtransparency.net/; 
http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/issue/; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/jul/13/cameron-myaid-development; 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ukaid-guarantee; http://www.openaid.se/en.  
9
 An ‘Aid Transparency Assessment’ was produced in 2010 by Publish What You Fund (PWYF, 2010). 
While this is an important and pioneering contribution to the aid transparency and accountability 
field, it does not attempt to assess the impact of aid transparency, but the extent of it. 
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fields set out above. Given the paucity of literature, my research strategy also included 
identifying key initiatives and organisations in this field and seeking interviews with key 
respondents from as representative a cross-section of these as time and availability 
allowed10.  
 
3.  The uncertain relationship between aid transparency and 
accountable aid11 
 
 How does aid transparency relate to aid accountability? Let us take transparency to 
be a "characteristic of governments, companies, organisations and individuals of being open 
in the clear disclosure of information rules, plans, processes and actions" (Transparency 
International 2009: 44), and accountability to be the process of holding actors accountable 
for their actions. The broad consensus about the relationship between transparency and 
accountability as they relate to aid is that transparency is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for aid accountability.  Aid transparency initiatives constitute a sub-set within the 
broader, longer-standing aid accountability field.  Many aid transparency initiatives stop 
short of claiming to deliver accountability, stressing the intrinsic importance of aid 
transparency in its own right, in this respect resonating with freedom of information 
advocacy. Others purport to contribute directly to aid which is more accountable, be it to 
donors, tax-payers or marginalized people.  Many of the initiatives that make up the 
contemporary aid transparency movement, if they consider at all the relationship between 
transparency and accountability, seem to assume that more aid transparency will lead 
straightforwardly to more accountable aid.   
 Aid presents unusual accountability conundrums compared to other fields of 
transparency and accountability work, such as those reviewed in other articles in this 
volume.  Christensen et al. articulate this: 
 
                                               
10
 These were Romilly Greenhill (IATI), Owen Barder (aidinfo), Richard Manning (aid effectiveness 
expert, formerly of DFID and DAC), Karin Christiansen (then at Publish What You Fund), Robert Lloyd 
(then at One World Trust), Sarah Mulley (Institute for Public Policy Research, formerly Debt Relief 
International and the UK Advocacy Network) and Chad Dobson (Bank Information Center). In addition, 
early scoping and definitional discussions were held with Publish What You Fund, Matthew Martin 
(Debt Relief International/Development Finance International), Martin Tisné and the Donor Aid 
Reference Group of the Transparency and Accountability Initiative. I am grateful to all for their time, 
insights and information shared.  
11
 To borrow from the title of Jonathan Fox’s (2007) article ‘The uncertain relationship between 
transparency and accountability’. 
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[v]oters in donor countries do not receive the benefits of foreign aid directly and 
thus cannot monitor government policy in the same way, for example, they might 
notice the quality of their nearby roads, schools, or hospitals. Instead, monitoring 
foreign aid can only happen at great distances, and the primary beneficiaries cannot 
directly influence the incentives of their benefactors. And this likely reduces the 
interest and effectiveness of voters in monitoring foreign aid outcomes (2010: 7). 
 
 Thus, the Northern tax-paying accountability seekers cannot observe the effects of 
aid; and the intended beneficiaries of aid have no voice in the donor countries’ formal 
political accountability mechanisms such as elections.  Transparency in democratic political 
systems is supposed to help solve the ‘principal-agent’ problem, meaning the problem that 
arises when policy-makers entrusted with power to take decisions and perform duties on 
behalf of people abuse that power by acting in their own selfish interests to subvert policy 
intentions (Eyben, 2008; de Renzio, 2006). Transparency reduces the power of the ‘agents’ 
(the policy-makers) by making more information available to the ‘principal’ (the public, 
voters) so that they can ensure that processes deliver outcomes closer to their preferences 
(Christensen et al., 2010). The fact that aid providers and putative beneficiaries are distinct 
actors separated by large distances is seen to leave ‘feedback loops’. These get in the way of 
the straightforward resolution of the ‘principal-agent’ problem and need to be closed via 
transparency initiatives tailored to these circumstances (see for example aidinfo, 2008).  
 
 
 4 Expectations, assumptions and what the evidence suggests about 
impact 
While many cases and claims are made for what aid TAIs will achieve, available evidence 
tends to focus on the hypothetical or actual negative consequences of a lack of it, rather 
than on outcomes resulting from it. The assumptions about how positive outcomes would 
come about are little discussed and rarely explicit.  
 
 It is claimed that aid TAIs "matter for many reasons - from improving governance 
and accountability and increasing the effectiveness of aid to lifting as many people out of 
poverty as possible" (PWYF, 2010: 7). In terms of the various "cases" for social accountability 
set out in McGee and Gaventa (2010; 2011), the span runs from the "empowerment case" 
through the "democratic outcomes" case to the "developmental outcomes" case.  The point 
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I would stress here is not that any of these ‘cases’ applied to aid transparency is worth more 
effort than any other; in given circumstances, any or several of them may be worthy ends to 
pursue. The point is, rather, that in keeping with the point made by McGee and Gaventa 
(2010; 2011) referring to TAIs more generally, that aid T&A would certainly benefit from 
more clarity and realism about the ultimate ends of initiatives, and more explicit exploration 
of how the various cases can be effectively combined within one initiative.  
 
The new aid transparency movement and the official aid accountability school reflect a 
predominant concern with aid effectiveness, an important developmental outcome both in 
itself but also in its scope to justify aid expenditure to tax-payers in donor countries.  The 
NGO accountability sub-field in the past has been more associated with empowerment and 
democratic objectives – for instance focusing strongly on promoting programme 
participants’ active citizenship and making international NGOs’ ‘partnerships’ with local 
Southern organisations more horizontal and genuine. Lately NGOs too have shifted attention 
to aid effectiveness concerns.     
 
  As aid is managed by both aid-givers and aid-receivers, a transparency and 
accountability lens can be applied to both the giving and the receiving (Mulley, 2010). Most 
aid TAIs so far come from the perspective of aid givers – official donor agencies, or INGOs in 
their capacity as donors or conduits of funding to their partners . IIn contrast, much budget 
transparency and accountability work (eg that reviewed by Carlitz 2012, this volume) relates 
to the overall transparency and accountability of aid-recipient governments, but rather than 
focusing specifically on their management of aid itself it focuses on their management of 
public budgets, into which aid flows, fast becoming indistinguishable from other sources of 
revenue,. In new aid transparency movement  and official aid accountability activities, and to 
some extent NGO aid accountability activities, accounting to those who fund aid - tax-
payers, grassroots members and supporters – seems to dominate over accounting to those 
who receive it or in whose name it is managed and spent – marginalized people in the global 
South, whether users of aid-funded public services or participants in NGO programmes.  
While NGO accountability’s beginnings lie in a strong imperative to account to partners and 
programme participants as well as to the NGOs’ private donors and supporters, NGOs’ 
accountability to institutional and corporate donors has gained ground more recently.    
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 The diagram below presents in simplified form the range of focuses, cases and bases 
behind aid TAIs implemented at different levels by different agents, arranging them along a 
spectrum. The spectrum should not be taken to imply absolute separation between state 
actors and social actors: for instance many Northern NGOs try to enhance their 
development impact by strengthening their partnerships with Southern NGOs, and Northern 
governments’ publication of aid data advances the democratic right to information as well as 
improving aid effectiveness via improved predictability. 
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Figure 1: Focuses, cases, basis and actors in aid TAIs12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The aid TAIs that seek to contribute to more effective aid and greater poverty 
reduction are based on a causal pathway that leads from increased transparency and more 
accountable aid to this ultimate aim. What many initiatives directly seek to produce is 
increased aid transparency. How that will lead on to accountability and the ultimate aim of 
more effective aid and poverty reduction tends to be assumed rather than explicit. These 
links are hypothesised, but are complex to prove and only weakly or partially substantiated 
in the aid literature.  
  
 Aid transparency initiatives aiming to improve recipients’ public finance 
management are expected to directly improve budget management in recipient countries 
and thereby indirectly improve the coverage and effectiveness of public services to the poor. 
                                               
12
 On the International Budget Partnership’s Six questions campaign see 
http://internationalbudget.org/publications/ask-your-government-initiative-slide-show/; on Eurodad 
see http://www.eurodad.org/; on ActionAid see http://www.actionaid.org/?intl= ; on HAP see 
http://www.hapinternational.org/; on World Bank Inspection Panel see  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,menuPK:64132057~pagePK:
64130364~piPK:64132056~theSitePK:380794,00.html. URLs where further information can be found 
on all the rest of the initiatives in Figure 1 are already given in footnote 10 above.   
Developmental 
outcomes case 
 
 
Technical basis 
Empowerment outcomes 
case 
 
 
Normative, value or rights 
basis  
‘Paris aid 
effectiveness’ and 
MDGs focus: State-
led, e.g. IATI; 
citizen-led e.g. 
Publish What You 
Fund; state-citizen 
collaboration e.g. 
aidinfo 
 
 
Aid-recipient 
governments’ 
‘Public Finance 
Management’ 
focus: Official 
donors and civil 
society ‘better aid’ 
advocates, e.g. 
Eurodad, AidData  
 
Aid-recipient 
governments’ 
‘domestic 
accountability’ focus: 
Official donors and 
civil society ‘better 
aid’ and 
accountability 
advocates, e.g. 
International Budget 
Partnership’s’Ask Your 
Government’ 
campaign 
Partnership 
focus: 
northern 
NGOs. E.g. 
ActionAid’s 
ALPS; 
Humanitarian 
Accountability 
Partnership 
 
Right to information focus 
(northern tax-payers’ and 
southern beneficiaries’ right) 
FoI campaigners, ‘better aid’ 
advocates, democratically 
accountable Northern 
governments. E.g. proposed 
UK aid watchdog; World 
Bank Inspection Panel - 
claims filed by southern 
parties affected by projects 
Democratic  
outcomes case 
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The same transparency initiatives are expected to reduce corruption and make recipient 
governments more accountable to their citizens, by feeding information either to social 
accountability initiatives or to horizontal accountability actors like Parliamentarians, audit 
institutions and the media.  
 
 ‘Partnership’-focused initiatives relate to a value-based concern with unequal power 
relations in the aid system and more broadly. Moving further right along the spectrum, 
normative arguments rooted in a ‘right to information’ perspective come from some 
unexpected quarters including new technology users who advocate for open-access 
information of all kinds as public goods. Such positions are seen as self-evident and needing 
no justification by reference to expected impacts.   
 
 I have teased out here the direct and indirect impacts and assumptions that are 
expected to arise from the various initiatives reviewed: in short, their underlying programme 
logics, causal pathways or ‘theories of change’. In general, these are not made explicit in 
programme documents. The various positive impacts expected are seen as self-evident 
‘goods’ that do not require articulation. In the absence of articulated expected outcomes 
and impacts it is hard to demonstrate impact, as it is not clear against what to track 
progress13.   
 
In the 2010 review, detailed analysis was conducted of the sample of sources shown in Table 
1 below..  The sample consists of two sources on recent aid transparency initiatives; two on 
official aid accountability measures; and three from the NGO aid accountability literature.  
Taken together they deploy a wide range of methodologies and methods for exploring the 
effect and impact of the TAIs on which they focus. 
 
Table 1: Sample of literature addressing impact and effectiveness of aid TAIs 
 
New aid transparency movement 
Collin et al. 
(2009) 
Cost-benefit analysis of implementation of IATI standards/advocacy paper, 
produced by civil society research and advocacy programme, a ‘critical partner’ to 
IATI. Rare example of systematic attempt to quantify impact of continued non-
                                               
13
 Attempts to calculate costs of non-transparent aid (eg. Collins et al., 2009; Moon, 2010; Moon and 
Williamson, 2010) do offer some proxy for clearly-articulated expected benefits.  
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transparency.  
Christensen et 
al. (2010) 
Research paper by academic ‘info-mediaries’ connected to Aid-Data, studying 
relationship between aid transparency and recipient government corruption levels. 
Accountability in official aid spheres 
Martin (2010) Background study for United Nations Development Cooperation Forum 
commissioned by UN Economic and Social Council. Explores how to enhance Paris 
principle of mutual accountability in official aid and make aid more transparent. 
Includes the first assessment of the effectiveness and emerging impacts of new 
wave of aid transparency initiatives.  
African 
Development 
Bank (2009) 
Institutional publication reporting on policy-focused research by staffers and high-
level African government officials, into use of debt relief in relation to social 
spending. Covers aid transparency and accountability as factors influencing 
effectiveness of official aid and debt relief. 
NGO accountability literature 
Clark et al. 
(2003) 
Review of effectiveness of World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP), an aid 
accountability mechanism introduced in international financial institutions thanks 
to civil society campaigners, and monitored by them. Assesses WBIP’s performance 
and impacts over its ten-year history. 
David et al. 
(2006) 
Situated, critically reflective account of one international NGO’s approach to 
improving own accountability and transparency to partners and beneficiaries 
(ALPS), authored by some of its architects. 
Jacobs and 
Wilford (2010) 
Presents ‘Listen First’ framework for systematic management of downwards 
accountability in NGOs, informed by review of existing NGO approaches. 
 
Elsewhere I have reviewed in detail the methodological approaches and the quality and 
nature of the evidence of impact and effectiveness, presented in these sources (McGee & 
Gaventa 2010; 2011).   Here a brief overview of these aspects will suffice. 
  
Looking across the seven, few and diverse as they are, some broad ‘overview’ 
methodological statements can be made about the state and nature of the evidence and the 
methodological approaches used to gather and construct it. Evidence on the impact and 
effectiveness of aid accountability and transparency initiatives is scant14. There are few 
sources that attempt to assess impact and not many explore effectiveness of aid 
                                               
14
 This finding applies also to the humanitarian accountability sub-field, from which NGO 
accountability work largely originates. The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership’s 2009 report 
(HAP, 2009) closes by lamenting the lack of ‘proof’ of impact and committing the sector to remedying 
this.  
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transparency and accountability. The evidence is also highly diverse. This diversity does not 
necessarily constitute a weakness. It reflects the diversity of the field, the agents involved 
and the initiatives themselves. For instance, what amounts to valid impact information for a 
profound and slow process of organisational change such as Action Aid’s ALPS makes no 
sense in relation to multi-country statistical analysis of the relationships between 
internationally recognized governance and transparency indices, and vice versa.  
 
 The scant quantity of evidence could reflect the newness of some aid transparency 
initiatives, but this is hardly the case for the NGOs that have long been pioneering aid 
accountability initiatives.  The impact of their work is quite uncharted territory.  Many of the 
NGOs involved even in relatively high-profile NGO aid accountability mechanisms and 
processes have not attempted to assess for external consumption what their own 
accountability and transparency efforts have achieved, in terms of better partnerships and 
more effective programmes. This may be because they prioritise ‘downward’ accountability 
to partners over convincing external aid skeptics or ‘NGO-bashers’. Alternatively it may be 
because they frame themselves and their accountability efforts as somehow beyond doubt 
because of the value-based foundations of their organisations. But they are under increasing 
pressure to do the latter to assure their funding and safeguard their sector and their 
individual ‘brand’. It no doubt poses conceptual and methodological challenges, but if these 
are met with epistemological and methodological clarity and care, they are not insuperable.  
 
 One basic but vital step towards improving the state of knowledge on the impact of 
aid accountability and transparency initiatives is therefore the recognition of the breadth of 
initiatives and approaches that this loosely-defined field comprises. This in turn calls for 
adoption of the principle of methodological pluralism and eclecticism as a starting point in 
evaluating, enhancing and expanding the evidence available, and the more general 
methodological principle that research design should flow conceptually and logically from 
the questions being asked. Cross-country statistical analysis of large data sets has proven 
useful for determining correlations and testing causal relationships between pre-specified 
theorised or hypothesised impacts associated with new-wave aid transparency initiatives. In-
depth and often ‘insider’ qualitative case studies have been used for identifying in more 
empirical, inductive and open-ended ways the effects of ‘deep-downward’ accountability 
and transparency initiatives applied by individual NGOs, and exploring how these were 
attained, including via sensitivity to power dynamics and individual contexts. One case very 
14 
 
successfully combines methods, by including in the latter approach some quantitative aid 
(debt relief) data analysis, but strongly emphasises the explanatory powers of the qualitative 
policy and institutional analysis from the point of view of the research’s policy relevance and 
utility (AfDB, 2009). Attempts to assess or predict impacts of contemporary  aid 
transparency initiatives of necessity involve some methodological innovation, generally 
carried out in an explicit spirit of openness to criticism and inputs that could improve their 
quality, rigour and utility. A final observation is that the methods at work in each of the 
three aid TAI sub-fields are quite distinct, evincing little if any cross-fertilisation. What goes 
on within them is so different that this may be no surprise, but it is still likely that learning 
potential is being missed, through failure to analyse more deeply their connections and 
differences and extracting insights that might help in assessing impact within each sub-field.   
 
5 Which Factors Shape  the Impact and Effectiveness of Aid TAIs?  
The various sources reviewed place very different degrees of emphasis on explaining 
impacts as opposed to detecting or predicting them. Guided by a reading of relevant analysis 
and experience in the broader accountability and transparency field, and by the sources 
reviewed, I discuss the question of what contributes to impact, in terms of three sets of 
factors. 
 
5.1 Interfaces Between State and Citizen Actors 
Both the literature and my key informant interviews, in keeping with emerging lessons from 
the broader literature on citizen-led social accountability and transparency, reveal the 
importance of the interfaces between citizens and state actors that social accountability 
initiatives create, and at which they are played out. That power relationships between aid 
accountability seekers and agents start off and remain unequal throughout, can be read off 
from  the low degree and weak nature of enforceability and answerability in most cases. Yet 
the fact that a relationship is constructed and maintained at all appears key to effectiveness 
and impact.  
 
 Take the case of IATI, launched by DFID and its DAC peer group of official aid 
agencies, but called into being in large part by civil society campaigning. It is donor-led and, 
many civil society aid experts would argue, heavily driven by donor interests. But its steering 
committee includes civil society advocates the Better Aid network, PWYF, Transparency 
International and Civicus; civil society aid 'info-mediary' and research actors AidData and 
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Development Initiatives for Poverty Research; and the private philanthropic Hewlett 
Foundation, as well as a sub-set of its bilateral and multilateral official donor members (IATI 
n.d: 4). From its inception it has drawn extensively on the research and analytical capabilities 
of civil society allies, in particular aidinfo. According to one assessment(, the existence of a 
strong international civil society-led campaign in PWYF, "designed to ensure application of 
[the IATI] principles as well as a universal right to request and receive information about aid" 
is crucial to IATI’s relevance and potential impact (Martin 2010: 20),. It is clear from other 
evidence reviewed (Christensen et al., 2010; Collin et al., 2009) that some of the potential 
powers of aid transparency initiatives such as IATI or AidData are only unlocked by non-
governmental, academic and campaigning ‘info-mediaries’. As compared to simple demand-
side or simple supply-side initiatives and one-off encounters, the state-citizen collaboration 
that goes on over the interfaces of a multi-stakeholder process adds to the capacity, 
outreach, utilisation, legitimacy and authority of the initiative, and must be critical to its 
impact, whether or however this is measured.  
 
 Seen thus, what might at first appear ‘self-regulatory’ aid transparency activities by 
Northern governments with some degree of democratic accountability are rarely so self-
initiated or self-regulating. The state, as the accountability ‘agent’, is behaving in a way that 
reflects actual or anticipated accountability demands of the social actors or citizens, as the 
‘principals’. Frequently, the ‘principals’ are taking a stance summed up by one interviewee 
by paraphrasing ex-US President Harry Truman: "It is amazing what you can accomplish if 
you do not care who gets the credit".  
 
 Moreover, it appears that when aid TAIs establish accountability interfaces between 
citizen and state actors that have a global as well as a national or local dimension, this 
further enhances the prospects of impact. This proposition is hard to prove,  but every aid 
transparency and accountability actor interviewed for the review counted their membership 
of a global or transnational aid transparency movement as a factor in actual and likely 
effectiveness.  The WBIP experience (Clark et al., 2003) demonstrates how the transnational 
quality of aid accountability and transparency demands the engagement of differently 
positioned social actors in North and South in transnational strategies, adding a 
transnational dimension to the state-citizen interfaces. The WBIP case studies show on the 
one hand that the criterion that WBIP claims must come from directly affected Southern 
parties has ensured authenticity and focus and made the Panel a very citizen-led initiative. 
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Yet they also demonstrate multiple ways in which the work of transnational coalitions 
behind and around the Southern claimants has been vital: from raising initial awareness of 
the Panel as a recourse, to providing the necessary technical knowhow to claimants, to 
tracking the process through the machinery, to providing critique to the World Bank on the 
mechanism itself.  
 
 These observations about accountability interfaces show them to be different from 
the accountability interactions between CSOs and governments envisaged in classic political 
science theory and aid theory, of civil society or citizens’ organisations acting as ‘checks and 
balances’ on their government. Moreover, for the case of donor-initiated TAIs which ‘expect’ 
information-hungry aid-watching members of Northern publics to engage with them, it is 
not clear that this has happened.  IATI is rarely in the UK news and the UK government’s 
2010 announcements about MyAid and the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee have not been 
followed by extensive media coverage or prominent public interest. In the aid-recipient 
context, according to the aid donor ideal, citizens grouped together as civil society 
associations make good the imperfections or inequitable access inherent in political 
accountability mechanisms with social accountability mechanisms, thereby contributing to 
more effective and socially equitable outcomes to aid and public policy, spending and 
governance in general. While there is some evidence from other sources that ‘civil society’ 
does operate in this way and to this effect in aid-recipient countries (see for instance Barder, 
2009), the evidence is piecemeal, and many assumptions remain unproven.  On the other 
hand, PWYF as a civil society actor closely networked with governments, has become the 
centre of a lively and well-networked civil society/state aid transparency alliance.. What we 
can say from the available evidence is that what goes on at the interfaces between state and 
citizen actors is not, or not only, ‘checking and balancing’, but, often, quite complex and 
sustained forms of collaboration, in pursuit of a mutual interest or distinct but 
complementary interests.   
 
  
5.2 Framings of aid transparency 
A second set of factors that appear to determine the outcomes of aid TAIs are to do with 
framing and, closely associated with it, incentives to engagement - what hooks the relevant 
actors in and keeps them there?  Framing, in the context of collective action, refers to "the 
conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the 
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world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam et al., 
1996: 6).  
 
 A powerful factor in the recent surge of aid transparency initiatives has been 
acceptance of the ‘public good’ framing of transparency overall, and aid transparency in 
particular. Aidinfo’s cost and benefit work does not point unequivocally to huge cost savings, 
suggesting  that public goods arguments around IATI may have proved more persuasive than  
cost concerns.  Rights-based framings invoking tax-paying citizens’ right to information 
clearly appeal broadly in Northern liberal democracies. The headway made by the 
contemporary aid transparency movement also owes a lot to peer pressure factors: the 
movement’s framing of transparency as a desirable,  assessable and rankable quality of aid 
donors seems to prove as persuasive to DAC members as the risk that they will undermine 
their own Paris commitments if they fail to respond comprehensively to advocates’ calls for 
better and more accessible aid information (interview notes 15). 
 
 International NGOs’ downward aid accountability and transparency approaches are 
played out between the NGO (which occupies the role of ‘donor’ as well as aspiring to be a 
‘partner’), Southern social actors (e.g. local or national NGO partners, faith-based groups or 
producers’ associations), and Southern marginalised communities. They are often framed as 
an explicit attempt to change the power dynamics between the NGO and these others, 
bringing the organisation’s practice nearer to its stated principles of participation, integral 
accountability, empowerment and others16. This point speaks to the link between 
accountability and participation in aid relationships and dynamics. Where aid TAIs unfold 
within an aid relationship framed as a partnership based on empowered participation in all 
aspects, as the relationship between INGOs and their southern partners often is,  beneficiary 
and user involvement will probably ensue naturally. That sort of empowered engagement 
cannot be expected in aid TAIs that frame partner organisations or primary stakeholders as 
hapless beneficiaries, or leave them out of the picture altogether.  
 
 Moving past the local partner organisations and looking further down the 
accountability chain, it seems evident that efforts to engage poor, marginalized people in 
                                               
15
 Interview with Karin Christiansen, PWYF. 
16
 The international NGO’s invitation to these others to take up opportunities to voice opinions and 
criticisms and shape policy and practice is not always easily understood or taken up, as described by 
David et al. (2006).   
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Southern countries in realising the developmental or democratic potentials of aid 
transparency and accountability, need to start from awareness of these citizens’ 
circumstances, their framings of the need for aid accountability and transparency, and the 
incentives and disincentives they face to engage with TAIs. This awareness is not readily 
detectable in the design of most aid TAIs reviewed. As an illustration of why this matters, 
consider the narrow conception of transparency that informs most new-wave aid 
transparency initiatives. Transparency all too often seems to be framed as the availability 
and accessibility of statistics, albeit timely, comprehensive and comparable statistics. In fact 
many activists and observers concerned about the uses and effectiveness of aid are 
interested less in the numbers than in the policies and guidelines, or even the politics and 
relationships, which shape aid allocation and orientation or establish aid conditionality. 
Arguably, until aid transparency initiatives shake off this association with quantified data and 
respond to a broader range of information demands and a broader set of accountability 
issues, aid transparency will risk remaining an area of "opaque transparency" rather than 
"clear transparency", to use Fox’s distinctions (2007: 667). As such it may offer limited 
appeal to potential ‘participants’.  
 
5.3 Legal Frameworks and Institutions  
A third and final set of factors affecting aid TAIs’ impact and effectiveness are structural and 
institutional, relating to political institutions, legal frameworks and organisational and 
societal characteristics. We know that one key way in which social accountability 
mechanisms and actors can have effect is by activating the formal political accountability 
mechanisms that exist and function, to greater or lesser extents, in variously democratic 
polities (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2006). Much aid within the purview of  prominent aid TAIs 
today is government-to-government, so for aid TAIs to be effective and functional,  formal 
political accountability mechanisms in donor and recipient countries need to work, domestic 
budget processes need to be fairly transparent and  governments need to be responsive  to 
the demands of their electorates.  For all the potential of citizen-led and social accountability 
initiatives in North or South, it seems they can hardly enhance the transparency and 
accountability of government-to-government aid in the absence of functional formal 
accountability principles and mechanisms and transparent budget processes in recipient 
countries. By extension, they need to be deliberately designed to build and strengthen these 
formal political mechanisms and transparency impulses rather than supplanting them, .  The 
fact that the field of budget transparency and accountability work (see Carlitz, this volume) 
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has expanded so rapidly attests to how often formal political accountability mechanisms do 
not function well enough alone and require social accountability efforts to activate them in 
order to achieve more accountable budgeting in aid-recipient countries.  
 
 It is clear from the foregoing that because of the role aid plays in the budgets of 
many recipient countries, aid transparency is needed if recipient countries’ budgets are to 
become more transparent. It is also clear how the prospects of impacts from aid TAIs 
depend in great measure on the state of budget transparency and the right to information in 
aid-recipient countries, and on the right to information in donor countries. As discussed by 
Calland and Bentley (this volume), Access to Information legislation is a conducive if 
insufficient condition for Access to Information initiatives – related to aid, domestic budgets 
or anything else – to work well. The existence of such legislation and/or other related policy 
frameworks help to ensure impact from aid TAIs, especially aid transparency initiatives that 
directly and vociferously invoke citizens’ right to information. The insufficiency lies in the 
fact that to make the right to information effective, citizen activism  is often needed as a 
complement to the law itself, to actually trigger the sanctions and enforceability 
mechanisms it provides. , .    
 
6 Conclusion: Beyond aid transparency to more accountable aid  
Most sources on aid transparency are very vague in relation to the theories of change, 
programme logics or causal pathways that underpin them17. The vagueness constitutes a 
weakness, and not only for academics or impact assessors whose analysis is obstructed by it. 
In the field of aid accountability and transparency, the links between inputs, intermediate 
outputs and final impacts are often articulated normatively or technocratically rather than 
descriptively or analytically, or not well understood or articulated at all, and far from proven. 
These attributes constitute a strong case for the proponents of aid TAIs to better develop, 
articulate or explicate the initiatives’ underlying theories of change or causal logics.  
 
 If the current vagueness around aid TAIs’ theories of change constitutes a weakness, 
it also constitutes an opportunity. Now that factors contributing to impact or failure have 
begun to be identified for TAIs in general and aid TAIs in particular, there is scope for future 
                                               
17
 Aidinfo, and the Open Budget Initiative of the International Budget Partnership which looks into aid 
transparency issues via its ‘Six Questions Campaign’, constitute known exceptions, in having clearly 
defined theories of change – there may be others. Both receive support from the Hewlett Foundation, 
which currently seems to lead the donor field in the sense of requiring partners to articulate theories 
of change (other donors require some aspects of these articulated in other forms, such as log-frames).  
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aid TAIs to purposefully incorporate these into their design and implementation. At the most 
obvious level, this would help address the problem of an "uncertain relationship" between 
aid transparency and more accountable aid. At another vitally important level, it would lead 
to the exposure and revision of untested and shaky assumptions about the appeal and 
‘friendliness’ of aid TAIs to their putative users, especially marginalised people in aid-
recipient countries.  
 
Limited but probably significant evidence18 suggests that for aid TAIs to succeed in 
effectively engaging Southern citizens or social actors – as users, beneficiaries or 
stakeholders who make representations to their governments, publicly-funded international 
NGOs or official donors - better understandings of these potential accountability claimants 
are needed. Approaches need to be grounded much more firmly in empirical experience 
about them and less in suppositions, from the very conception of the initiative onwards.  
Simply contemplating the width of the experiential abyss that lies between information-age 
cybernaut ‘info-mediaries’ based at US universities, and illiterate rural Mozambicans who 
could turn aid data into citizen-led accountability demands leveled at their local 
government, reinforces this point.  On the one hand aid transparency ‘digital natives’, and 
on the other  accountability-hungry development practitioners and the marginalized citizens 
with whom they work, might well be described as ‘a solution in search of a problem’ and ‘a 
problem in search of a solution’ respectively 19.   
 
 Besides this need to underpin initiatives with more explicit, grounded theories of 
change and to treat critically the nature of the transparency that many aid-related 
transparency initiatives currently offer, there are other major gaps to be addressed. One lies 
in the design process: at the stage of designing the initiative, the question of how impact will 
actually be attained as well as assessed, needs to be thought through.  Despite the recent 
vintage of many TAIs analysed here, this still did not seem to be happening at the time of 
this research, even for the relatively high-profile IATI. Another gap relates to the paucity of 
evidence in general about whether aid TAIs are having an impact and how. The evidence 
base needs building further.  Given the abundance of untested assumptions pointed to and 
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 In Martin (2010) and Martin (pers. comm.) Also in the aidinfo Nicaragua case study (Beech, 2010) 
which revealed low user awareness or interest about where funds spent locally come from and 
suggested that recent approaches to enhancing aid transparency needed much better grounding in 
such local realities in aid-dependent countries.  
19
 Credit for this aphorism is due not to me, but to Janet Haven of the Information Programme at the 
Open Society Foundations, speaking at a meeting convened by the Accountability and transparency 
Initiative in San Francisco in October 2010.  
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the complexities and subtleties of accountability in the context of international aid 
relationships, the explanatory power of in-depth case study methodologies seems to afford 
great explanatory power for advancing understanding of impact dynamics in this field.  
 
A final gap relates to the ‘aid chain’ (Wallace et al 2006) in which aid transparency and 
accountability are sought and constructed.  One consequence of the nature of the ‘aid chain’ 
is that no matter how transparent northern aid-donor governments might be about the aid 
they give, they too are accountability seekers.  Their transparency-giving efforts cannot but 
remain superficial until their ‘partner’ or aid-recipient governments increase their own 
transparency and accountability.  That process cannot be activated and sustained by 
concerned donor agencies but, to be far-reaching and sustainable, must come about 
through the active engagement of partner country citizens.  While this is recognised in the 
motivation or the rhetoric behind many aid TAIs, it does not seem to permeate their design 
and operational mechanisms.   
 
This, then, is my argument: insofar as can be determined from current knowledge on the 
impact of aid TAIs, they are not adequately resolving the accountability challenges posed by 
the fact that aid accountability seekers are largely made up of very dissimilar, distant and 
disconnected groups of actors - Northern tax-payers and Southern intended beneficiaries of 
aid, plus aid-donor governments that espouse aid transparency.   This Achilles heel, affecting 
most aid TAIs to date, will only be resolved and aid TAIs’ objectives fulfilled when greater 
attention is paid to the purported beneficiaries of transparent, accountable aid and to their 
actual and potential involvement with TAIs.   
 Summing up, future attempts to remedy gaps in understanding of impact and 
effectiveness in the field of aid transparency and accountability need to take full account of 
diversity of the field in terms of actors, motivations and approaches; to work on the principle 
of methodological pluralism and eclecticism; and to keep in sight the complex and political 
nature of the aid relationship. More specifically, underlying assumptions about the full range 
of users and stakeholders in the South, whose interests most TAIs purport to serve, must be 
unpacked. Where are the accountability-seeking citizens on whom the aid transparency 
edifice rests?  They seem conspicuous by their absence in the conception and execution of 
most aid TAIs.   For aid TAIs to bear out their potential in terms of democratic, 
developmental or empowerment outcomes, there is a need to attend more closely to these 
people’s demands, circumstances and everyday realities, and to do so ‘upstream’ of the 
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delivery of additional aid information or invitations to comment on aid projects already 
approved or completed20.  Searching questions need to be asked.  ‘We’ may have built it, but 
have ‘they’ actually come?  Should ’we’ have built it?  Why would ‘they’ come, why should 
‘they’ come?  If ‘they’ built it, would ‘we’ come?  These questions go to the heart of what 
participation, accountability, transparency, empowerment and responsiveness mean within 
aid relationships, and it is to be hoped that forthcoming aid TAIs embody more satisfactory 
responses to them. ..   
References 
African Development Bank (2009) Debt Relief Initiatives, Development Assistance and Service 
Delivery in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Aidinfo (2008) ‘Better Information, Better Aid: consultation paper, Accra’, Development 
Initiatives, Wells, http://www.aidinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/better-
information-better-aid_eng1.pdf (Accessed November 2011). 
Barder, O. (2009) ‘The costs and benefits of aid transparency: A draft analytical framework’, 
unpublished paper, available from owen@devinit.org. 
Beech, A. (2010) 'Bottom-up tracking of aid resources in Nicaragua', Case Study 7, aidinfo,  
 http://www.aidinfo.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Case-Study-7-Bottom-up-
tracking Nicaragua.pdf (Accessed November 2011). 
Christensen, Z., Nielsen, R., Nielson, D. and Tierney, M. (2010) ‘Transparency Squared: The 
effects of donor transparency on recipient corruption levels’, Paper prepared for 
presentation at conference on Aid Transparency and Development Finance: Lessons 
and Insights from AidData, March 22-24 2010, Oxford University, UK. 
http://www.aiddata.org/oxford/agenda (Accessed July 2010).  
Clark, D., Fox, J. and Treakle, K. (eds) (2003) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims 
and the World Bank Inspection Panel, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Collin, M., A. Zubairi, D. Nielson and O. Barder 2009, The Costs and Benefits of Aid 
Transparency. Wells: aidinfo available at http://www.aidinfo.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/10/Costs-and-benefits-analysis.pdf (Accessed October 2011). 
David, R., Mancini, A. and Guijt, I. (2006) ‘Bringing Systems into Line with Values: The 
Practice of the Accountability, Learning and Planning System’, in Eyben, R. (ed) 
Relationships for Aid, London: Earthscan. 
De Renzio, P. (2006) ‘Aid, Budgets and Accountability: a survey article’, Development Policy 
Review 24 (6): 627-645. 
                                               
20
 This resembles the conclusion drawn by Fung et al 2007 for transparency measures overall. 
23 
 
Eyben, R. (2008) ‘Power, Mutual Accountability and Responsibility in the Practice of 
International Aid: a relational approach’, IDS Working Paper 305, Brighton: Institute 
of Development Studies. 
Fung, A., Graham M. and D. Weil (2007) Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of 
Transparency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fox, J. (2007) ‘The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability’, 
Development in Practice 17 (4-5): 663-671. 
International Aid Transparency Initiative, (n.d.) ‘Supporting Aid Transparency’, IATI, East 
Kilbride. http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/files/IATI-brochure.pdf (Accessed 
October 2011). 
Jacobs, A. and Wilford, R. (2010) ‘Listen First: a pilot system for managing downward 
accountability in NGOs’, Development in Practice 20 (7): 797-811. 
Lingán, J., Cavender, A., Lloyd, R. and Gwynne, B. (2009) ‘Responding to NGO Development 
Effectiveness Initiatives’, One World Trust/World Vision Briefing Paper 122, London: 
One World Trust, http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/cso/resources 
(Accessed  October 2011). 
Malena, C. with Forster, R. and Singh, J. (2004) ‘Social Accountability: An Introduction to the 
Concept and Emerging Practice’, Social Development Paper 76, Washington DC: 
World Bank. Martin, M. (2009) ‘Background Study for the Development Cooperation 
Forum High-Level Symposium: enhancing mutual accountability and transparency in 
development cooperation’, United Nations Economic and Social Council, New York, 
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf/analytical%20background%20study%2
0(mutual%20accountability%20and%20aid%20transparency).pdf (Accessed July 
2010). 
Martin, M. (2010) ‘Background Paper for Development Cooperation Forum High-Level 
Symposium: review of progress in international and national mutual accountability 
and transparency on development cooperation’, United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, New York, http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf/ma_study-
status_and_progress.pdf (Accessed October 2011). 
McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (1996) Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures and cultural framings, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McGee, R. and Gaventa, J. (2010), 'Review of the Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency 
and Accountability Initiatives: Synthesis Report', http://www.transparency-
24 
 
initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/synthesis_report_final1.pdf (Accessed 
October 2011). 
McGee, R. and Gaventa, J. (forthcoming 2011), ‘Shifting Power? Assessing the impact of 
Transparency and Accountability Initiatives’, IDS Working Paper, Brighton: Institute 
of Development Studies. 
Moon, S. (2010) ‘Practical Approaches to the Aid Effectiveness Agenda: evidence in aligning 
aid information with developing country budgets’, ODI Working Paper 317, London: 
Overseas Development Institute and Publish What You Fund and Washington DC: 
International Budget Partnership.  
Moon, S. and Williamson, T. (2010) ‘Greater Aid Transparency: crucial for and effectiveness’, 
ODI Project Briefing 35, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
Mulley, S. (2010) ‘New Frontiers in Transparency and Accountability: donor/aid funding. 
Scoping/Concept Note – June 2010’, unpublished note. 
OECD (2005/8) ‘The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action’, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris,  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf (Accessed October 2011).   
Peruzzotti, E. and Smulovitz, C. (2006) 'Social Accountability: An Introduction', in Peruzzotti, 
E. and Smulovitz, C. (eds) Enforcing the Rule of Law: Social Accountability in the New 
Latin American Democracies, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
PWYF (2010) ‘Aid Transparency Assessment’, Publish What You Fund, London, 
http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/files/Aid-Transparency-Assessment.pdf 
(Accessed October 2011). 
Transparency International (2009) The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide, Berlin: 
Transparency International. 
Wallace, Tina with Lisa Bornstein and Jennifer Chapman (2006) The Aid Chain: Coercion and 
Commitment in Development NGOs, Rugby: Intermediate Technology Publications Ltd 
 
 
 
 
